Made Equal at the Beginning

But let us now go back to the order of the discussion we set out, and look at the beginning of creation — as far as the mind can look at the beginning of God’s creating. In that beginning, then, we are to suppose that God created as great a number of reasoning or thinking beings (or by whatever name they ought to be called — we have called them minds up to now) as he foresaw would be enough. It is certain that he made them to some definite number, fixed beforehand by himself. It is not to be imagined, as some would have it, that created things have no limit; for where there is no limit, nothing can be taken in and nothing can be bounded. And if that were how matters stood, then created things certainly could neither be held in check nor governed by God, since by its very nature anything unlimited is also beyond taking in. [a]

Moreover, as Scripture says, “God has arranged all things in number and measure.” Number, then, will be rightly applied to reasoning beings, or minds: there must be just so many of them as can be arranged, governed and kept in order by God. But measure will be fittingly applied to bodily matter, and this measure, we are to believe, was created by God such as he knew would be enough for the fitting out of the world.

These, then, are the things we are to believe were created by God in the beginning — that is, before all things. And this, we think, is pointed to even in that beginning which Moses brings in, in words that leave room for more than one sense, when he says: “In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth.” For it is certain that the dome of the sky is not what is meant there, nor the dry land, but that heaven and that earth from which the heaven and the earth we now see afterward borrowed their names.

But those reasoning natures which, as we said above, were made in the beginning, were created when they had not existed before; and simply because of that — because they once were not, and then began to be — they are necessarily changeable and unsteady. Whatever power was in their being was not in it by nature; it was the result of their Maker’s goodness. What they are, therefore, is not their own and does not last forever. It is given by God. It did not always exist, and anything that is a gift can also be taken back and disappear. [f]

The ground for taking it back will lie in the movements of souls not being carried on according to what is right and fitting. For the Creator granted to the minds he had made, as a free gift, the power of acting freely and willingly, so that the good that was in them might become their own, kept by the effort of their own will. But laziness, and a distaste for the work of keeping what is good, and a turning away from better things and a neglect of them, gave the start to a departure from goodness. And to depart from good is nothing else than to be made bad; for it is certain that to lack goodness is to be wicked. So it comes about that in the same measure as anyone falls away from goodness, in that same measure he becomes caught up in wickedness. In that condition each mind, according to what it did — neglecting goodness to a greater or a lesser degree — was dragged toward the opposite of good, which is undoubtedly evil.

From this it appears that the Creator of all things let in certain seeds and causes of variety and difference, so that he might create variety and difference to match the diversity of minds — that is, of reasoning beings — a diversity they must be supposed to have taken on from the cause we have mentioned above. And what we mean by variety and difference is what we now want to explain.

Now we use the word “world” for everything above the heavens, or in the heavens, or on the earth, or in the places called the regions below — for any places at all that exist anywhere, together with the beings that live in them. This whole is what is called the world. In this world certain beings are said to be above the heavens, placed in happier homes and clothed with heavenly, shining bodies; and among these many distinctions are shown to exist. The apostle, for instance, says: “There is one glory of the sun, another glory of the moon, another glory of the stars; for one star differs from another star in glory.” [g]

Others are called earthly, and among them — that is, among human beings — there is no small difference. Some are barbarians, others Greeks; and of the barbarians some are savage and fierce, others of a milder temper. Some live under laws that have been thoroughly tested and approved, others under laws of a meaner and harsher kind, while some again have customs of an inhuman and savage character rather than laws at all. Some, from the hour of their birth, are brought low and made subject and raised as slaves, set under the power of masters, or of rulers, or of tyrants. Others are brought up in a way more in keeping with freedom and reason. Some have sound bodies, some bodies diseased from their earliest years; some are defective in sight, others in hearing and in speech; some are born that way, others lose the use of their senses immediately after birth, or at any rate meet with such misfortune when they reach manhood. And why should I go over and list all the horrors of human misery — the ones some have been free of and others have been caught in — when anyone can weigh them and think them over for himself?

There are also certain invisible powers to which the management of earthly things has been entrusted, and among them too, we must believe, no small difference exists, just as it is found among human beings. The apostle Paul indeed hints that there are certain powers below, and among them, in the same way, a ground of diversity must undoubtedly be looked for. As for animals without speech, and birds, and the creatures that live in the waters, it seems pointless to ask about them, since it is certain that they are to be counted not of the first rank but of a lower one.

Now all things that have been created are said to have been made through Christ and in Christ, as the apostle Paul indicates most clearly when he says: “For in him and by him were all things created, whether things in heaven or things on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or authorities or rulers or lordships; all things were created by him and in him.” And John points to the same thing in his Gospel, saying: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made.” And in the Psalm too it is written, “In wisdom you have made them all.” [j]

Since, then, Christ is, so to speak, the Word and the Wisdom, and in the same way also the Righteousness, it undoubtedly follows that the things created in the Word and in Wisdom are said to have been created also in that righteousness which is Christ — so that in created things nothing may appear unjust or accidental, but everything may be shown to agree with the rule of fairness and righteousness.

How so great a variety of things, and so great a diversity, can be understood to be altogether just and right — that, I am sure, no human power and no human speech can explain, unless we throw ourselves down as beggars and pray to the Word himself, and Wisdom, and Righteousness, who is the only Son of God; and unless he pours himself by his gifts into our senses and sees fit to light up what is dark, to open what is shut, and to uncover what is hidden. That is, if we should be found to seek, or to ask, or to knock worthily enough to deserve to receive when we ask, to find when we seek, and to have the door opened to us when we knock.

Not relying, then, on our own powers, but on the help of that Wisdom which made all things, and of that Righteousness which we believe to be in all his creatures — although for the present we are unable to state it — we will try, trusting in his mercy, to look into the question and inquire how that great variety and diversity in the world may appear to be consistent with all righteousness and reason. I mean, of course, only reason in general; it would be a mark of ignorance to look for, and of folly to give, a special reason for every single case.

Now when we say that this world was established in the variety we have explained above, the variety in which God created it, and when we say that this God is good and righteous and utterly just, there are a great many people who object to us — above all those who have come from the school of Marcion, or Valentinus, or Basilides, and have been taught that there are souls of different natures. [n]

They say it cannot square with the justice of God, in creating the world, to assign to some of his creatures a home in the heavens; and not only to give them a better dwelling, but also to grant them a higher and more honorable position; to favor others with rule; to bestow powers on some and lordships on others; to award to some the most honorable seats in the courts of heaven; to let some shine with a brighter glory and glitter with the splendor of stars; to give to some the glory of the sun, to others the glory of the moon, to others the glory of the stars, and to make one star differ from another star in glory. To put it once for all, and briefly: if the Creator God lacks neither the will to undertake a good and perfect work nor the power to finish it, what reason can there be that in creating reasoning natures — beings of whose existence he himself is the cause — he should make some of the first rank, others of the second or the third, and many others of lower and inferior degrees?

Next they object to us, with regard to earthly beings, that a happier lot at birth falls to some rather than to others. One man, for instance, is born of Abraham and born by the promise; another of Isaac and Rebekah, a man who while still in the womb supplants his brother and is said to be loved by God before he was born. And this very thing is a ground of strong objection: that one man is born among the Hebrews, where he finds instruction in the divine law; another among the Greeks, who are themselves wise and men of no small learning; and then another among the Ethiopians, whose custom is to feed on human flesh, or among the Scythians, where killing a parent is an act allowed by law, or among the people of Tauris, where strangers are offered in sacrifice.

Their argument, accordingly, is this. If there is this great difference of circumstances, this varied and unequal condition at birth, in which the power of free choice has no scope at all — for no one chooses for himself where, or with whom, or in what condition he is born — and if this is not caused by a difference in the nature of souls, that is, by an evil-natured soul being destined for a wicked nation and a good soul for a righteous one, then what conclusion is left but that these things must be supposed to be governed by accident and chance? And if that is granted, then it will no longer be believed that the world was made by God or managed by his providence; and as a consequence a judgment of God upon the deeds of each person will look like something not to be expected at all. On this matter, what the truth of things plainly is belongs to him alone to know who searches all things, even the deep things of God.

We, however, though we are only men, will not feed the insolence of the heretics by our silence. We will answer their objections as best we can, so far as our abilities allow. We have often shown, from the declarations we were able to bring forward out of the holy Scriptures, that God, the Creator of all things, is good and just and all-powerful. When at the beginning he created the beings he wished to create — that is, reasoning natures — he had no other reason for creating them than himself: that is, his own goodness. And since he himself was the cause of the existence of the things that were to be created, and since in him there was no variation, no change and no lack of power, he created all whom he made equal and alike, because in himself there was no reason for producing variety and diversity. [r]

But since those reasoning creatures themselves, as we have often shown and will show again in its proper place, were given the power of free choice, this freedom of the will stirred each one either to make progress by imitating God, or brought him down to failure through negligence. And this, as we have already said, is the cause of the diversity among reasoning creatures: it takes its origin not from the will or the judgment of the Creator, but from the freedom of each one’s own will.

Now God, who thought it just to arrange his creatures according to what they deserved, brought these different minds down into the harmony of one world, so that he might furnish, as it were, a single house — in which there ought to be not only vessels of gold and silver but also of wood and clay, some for honor and others for dishonor — with those different vessels, or souls, or minds. And these, in my opinion, are the causes why that world presents the appearance of diversity, while divine providence goes on ordering each individual according to the variety of his movements, or of his feelings and his purpose. On that ground the Creator will not appear unjust in distributing to each one, for the causes already named, according to what he deserves; nor will the happiness or unhappiness of anyone’s birth, or whatever condition falls to his lot, be counted accidental; nor will it be believed that there are different creators, or souls of different natures.

But holy Scripture does not appear to me to be altogether silent about the nature of this secret. The apostle Paul, discussing the case of Jacob and Esau, says: “For the children being not yet born, and having done nothing either good or bad, so that the purpose of God according to election might stand — not from works, but from him who calls — it was said, The elder will serve the younger; as it is written, Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.” And after that he puts the question to himself and answers it. “What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God?” And so as to give us an opening to inquire into these matters and to find out how these things do not happen without a reason, he answers himself and says, “Absolutely not.” [t]

For it seems to me that the same question raised about Jacob and Esau may be raised about all creatures — the heavenly, the earthly, and those of the world below as well. And in the same way it seems to me that, as he says there, “the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil,” so it might also be said of everything else: “when they were not yet” created, “and had not yet done anything good or evil, so that the decree of God according to election might stand” — that (as some think) certain things were created heavenly, certain others earthly, and others again beneath the earth, “not from works” (as they think) “but from him who calls.” What shall we say then, if these things are so? “Is there injustice with God? Absolutely not.”

So then, when the Scriptures about Jacob and Esau are carefully examined, it is not found to be injustice with God that it should be said, before they were born or had done anything in this life, that “the elder will serve the younger”; and it is found to be no injustice that even in the womb Jacob supplanted his brother, if we understand that he was worthily loved by God according to what he deserved from his earlier life, so that he deserved to be preferred to his brother. And so it is also with the heavenly creatures, if we notice that the diversity was not the creature’s original condition, but that, owing to causes that had existed earlier, a different office is prepared by the Creator for each one in proportion to the measure of his merit — on this ground, namely, that each one, in respect of having been created by God as a mind, or a reasoning spirit, has gained for himself, according to the movements of his mind and the feelings of his soul, a greater or a smaller amount of merit, and has become either an object of God’s love or an object of his dislike.

Even so, some of those who possess greater merit are appointed to suffer along with the rest, for the fitting out of the state of the world and for the discharge of a duty owed to creatures of a lower grade, so that by this means they may themselves share in the endurance of the Creator, according to the words of the apostle: “For the creation was made subject to futility, not willingly, but by reason of him who subjected it, in hope.”

Keeping in view, then, the thought the apostle expresses when, speaking of the birth of Esau and Jacob, he says, “Is there injustice with God? Absolutely not,” I think it right that this same thought should be carefully applied to the case of all other creatures as well, because, as we remarked before, the righteousness of the Creator ought to appear in everything. And this, it appears to me, will be seen more clearly at the last, if each one — whether of the heavenly, or the earthly, or the creatures below — is said to have the causes of his own diversity in himself, and to have had them before his bodily birth. For all things were created by the Word of God and by his Wisdom, and were set in order by his Justice. And by the grace of his compassion he provides for all, and urges all to use whatever remedies may lead to their cure, and stirs them up toward salvation.